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GUUS DUINDAM* 
 
This brief essay responds to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Bucklew v. Precythe. It contends that the argument relied upon by the Court 
in that decision, as well as in Glossip v. Gross, is either trivial or 
demonstrably invalid. Hence, this essay provides a nonmoral reason to 
oppose the Court’s recent capital punishment decisions. The Court’s 
position that petitioners seeking to challenge a method of execution must 
identify a readily available and feasible alternative execution protocol is 
untenable, and must be revisited. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
When the State of Missouri executes Russel Bucklew later this year by 
way of lethal injection, the tumors which riddle his head, neck, and throat 
will likely rupture.1 If they do, Bucklew will die coughing and choking on 
his own blood. 2  An expert witness testified that “beginning with the 
injection . . . and ending with Mr. Bucklew’s death several minutes to as 
long as many minutes later, Mr. Bucklew would be highly likely to 
experience feelings of ‘air hunger’ and the excruciating pain of prolonged 
suffocation.”3 According to the Supreme Court, this punishment is neither 
cruel nor unusual.4 The Eighth Amendment, it held, “does not demand the 
avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.” 5  Bucklew’s 
challenge failed because, according to the majority, he did not identify a 
“feasible and readily implemented alternative” by which the state could 
have executed him.6 
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1 See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1138 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(reviewing the evidence presented by Bucklew regarding the likely effects of his lethal 
injection); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. 1112, at 8–12 (No. 17-
8151) (reviewing Bucklew’s medical condition and the likely effects of the lethal 
injection).  
2 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1138 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
3 Id. at 1139 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  
4 See id. at 1133 (majority opinion) (holding that the State was entitled to summary 
judgment on Bucklew’s Eighth Amendment claim).  
5 Id. at 1125. 
6 Id. at 1133.  
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Readers who have followed the Court’s recent capital punishment 
jurisprudence would not have been surprised at the Bucklew holding. In 
Glossip v. Gross, the Court added the macabre requirement that death-row 
prisoners cannot challenge an execution protocol unless they come up with 
a “known and available alternative method of execution” and establish that 
this method would be less painful than the existing method.7 In Arthur v. 
Dunn and Irick v. Tennessee, the Court refused even to consider challenges 
to execution protocols on grounds of unconstitutional cruelty, despite 
petitioners in both cases amassing significant evidence that their executions 
would involve “intolerable and needless agony”8—and despite the pleaded 
“known and available” alternatives: execution by firing squad9 and single-
drug lethal injection.10  
  
These decisions are evidence of an extraordinary shift in the Court’s 
thinking—away from its long-held view that the “basic concept underlying 
the Eighth Amendment” is “the dignity of man.”11 This move presents clear 
moral and legal challenges. But my aim here is not to relitigate these moral 
issues. They are already well covered by the extensive literature on 
executions and torture. Instead, this brief essay responds to the central 
argument relied upon by the Court to justify its holdings in Glossip and 
Bucklew, and demonstrates that it is invalid. Other recent critiques of the 
Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence risk preaching to the choir by 
appealing to broad anti-death-penalty arguments.12 In contrast, this essay 
concludes that the Court’s decisions must be opposed on simple logical 
grounds. 
 
 
 
7 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015). The Court alluded to this requirement—
that petitioners provide a known and available alternative method of execution and 
establish that it would be less painful—earlier in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008), 
and in Bucklew the Court refers to it as the “Baze-Glossip test.” 139 S. Ct. at 1126. 
Nevertheless, I will focus in this essay only on the test as it is used in Glossip and its 
progeny because (1) the test in Baze is less stringent than the one in Glossip, and (2) the 
essential holding in Baze does not depend on this requirement, whereas the holdings of 
Glossip and Bucklew fully depend on it.  
8 Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 725 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Irick v. 
Tennessee, 139 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that Tennessee’s 
lethal injection would “cause [Irick] to experience sensations of drowning, suffocating, 
and being burned alive from the inside out”). 
9 Arthur, 137 S. Ct. at 725 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
10 Irick, 139 S. Ct. at 4–5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
11 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
(1958)). 
12 See, e.g., Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth 
Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s defense of 
the death penalty is no longer viable); Thomas E. Robins, Retribution, the Evolving 
Standard of Decency, and Methods of Execution: The Inevitable Collision in Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 199 PENN ST. L. REV 885, 889 (2015) (arguing that the 
Court’s defense of the death penalty is internally inconsistent). 
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II.   THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT IN GLOSSIP AND BUCKLEW IS INVALID 
 
The Glossip majority argues that “because it is settled that capital 
punishment is constitutional, it necessarily follows that there must be a 
constitutional means of carrying it out.”13 It then concludes, claiming to be 
guided by this inference, 14  that petitioners cannot succeed in Eighth 
Amendment challenges unless they identify a readily available alternative 
method of execution.15 
 
There are two basic ways in which one could read the inference at the 
core of the Court’s recent death penalty decisions. The first is valid but 
trivial, and therefore meaningless. The second is plainly invalid. The first, 
trivial version can be summarized as follows: 
 
P1: Capital punishment does not invariably violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  
 
P2: If a punishment does not always violate the Constitution, there 
must be at least one conceivable means of carrying it out that is not 
unconstitutional. 
 
C1: Therefore, there is at least one conceivable means of carrying 
out the death penalty that is not unconstitutional.   
 
This argument is valid (the conclusion necessarily follows from the 
premises) and sound (the premises are all true). The first premise is 
explicitly affirmed in Gregg v. Georgia.16 And the second premise is true 
by definition: to say that there is no conceivable constitutional means of 
carrying out a punishment is just another way of saying that the punishment 
is not constitutional. Thus, the argument is sound. For much the same 
reason, it is only trivially valid. After all, to say that “not all executions are 
unconstitutional” (P1) is simply equivalent to the conclusion that “at least 
one execution is not unconstitutional” (C1). If the second phrase were 
false—that is, if there were no conceivable methods of execution that would 
not violate the constitution—then the first one would also be false—that is, 
all executions would be unconstitutional. The conclusion is just a repetition 
of the first premise; the argument has not moved the discussion forward. An 
argument whose conclusion simply repeats its first premise is no argument 
 
13 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)) (internal 
quotations and alterations omitted). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 135 S. Ct. at 2737 (“prisoners must identify an alternative that is ‘feasible, readily 
implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.’”) 
(citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008)). 
16 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 (“We now hold that the punishment of death does not 
invariably violate the Constitution.”) (emphasis added).  
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at all. Therefore, the Court could not have been guided by this first version 
of the argument in Glossip and Bucklew. By imposing new requirements on 
petitioners, those decisions go significantly beyond Gregg’s holding that 
capital punishment is not “invariably” unconstitutional.17  
 
 The second argument is nontrivial but fallacious. The Court explicitly 
endorsed this version of the argument, 18  and it can be summarized as 
follows19:  
 
P1*: Capital punishment does not invariably violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 
P2*: If a punishment does not always violate the Constitution, there 
must be at least one available means of carrying it out that is 
constitutional.  
 
C1*: Therefore, there must always be at least one available and 
constitutional means of carrying out a death sentence.  
 
C2*: Therefore, in order to successfully show that the state’s 
proposed method of execution is unconstitutional, a petitioner must 
show that there is another available method that would be better. 
Otherwise, all available methods of carrying out her execution 
would be unconstitutional. But this, by C1*, could never be the case 
because there must always be at least one constitutional means of 
executing her. Hence a petitioner’s challenge can only succeed if 
she can prove that there is a better available means of execution.   
 
It is hard to overstate the importance of this line of argument in the 
Court’s recent death penalty decisions. It is the sole justifying reason for the 
Court’s new requirement that petitioners propose their own alternative 
methods of execution. That standard is not otherwise justified by the Court’s 
earlier capital punishment decisions.20 It explains why Glossip and Bucklew 
require that petitioners provide a “known and available” method of 
execution. By the Court’s logic, if there is no “known and available”21 
method, then this necessarily rules out the possibility that the state’s chosen 
 
17 Id. 
18 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33, 2739; see also Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 
1140 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commenting on the Court’s reasoning in Glossip). 
19 Asterisks distinguish references to premises and conclusions in this version of the 
argument from those referring to premises and conclusions in the first version of the 
argument.   
20 It is discussed in Baze, but there justified by appeal to the same reasoning: “We begin 
with the principle, settled by Gregg, that capital punishment is constitutional. It 
necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying it out.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 
35, 47 (2008) (internal citations omitted).  
21 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1125 (citing Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738).  
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method is unconstitutional. After all, the alternative would be to hold that 
there is no “available” method of execution that would be permissible under 
the Constitution, and the Court takes itself to have conclusively ruled out 
this possibility.  
 
Once this argument is isolated from its disturbing context, its failings 
are evident. Where the inference in P2 is trivially valid, the inference in P2* 
is plainly invalid. Nothing about the bare constitutionality of capital 
punishment as much as suggests the conclusion that the best available 
method is always constitutional. P1* provides us with precisely no reason 
at all for thinking this.  
 
If the problem with P2* is not immediately obvious, imagine a judge 
who believes executions are constitutional if and only if they are painless. 
This judge affirms P1* and the decision in Gregg: she accepts that painless 
executions are constitutional, hence she accepts that not all executions are 
unconstitutional. (Put another way, she accepts that the death penalty does 
not “invariably” violate the Constitution.22) But this certainly does not 
commit her to the claim that there must always be a constitutional way to 
carry out a death sentence. To the contrary. If a state does not have any 
painless execution protocols on offer, it will, on this view, be incapable of 
carrying out a constitutional execution until it discovers or develops such a 
method. The crucial inference in P2* is simply indefensible.  
 
Because P2* is false and the trivial alternative, P2, does not help us get 
to C1* and C2*, the Court’s conclusions in Glossip and Bucklew (and their 
denials of certiorari in Arthur and Irick) were entirely unwarranted. 
Crucially, this is true regardless of one’s moral convictions about the death 
penalty or painful executions. 
 
III.   THE GLOSSIP TEST AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT  
 
Suppose now that what I have said so far is wrong. Suppose that it is a 
feature of the Eighth Amendment (albeit an until-recently-undiscovered 
feature) that inferences from holdings of the form “x is not invariably 
unconstitutional” to “there must always be at least one available 
constitutional means of imposing x” are valid. This would have 
extraordinary consequences for the structure of our entire penological 
system.  
 
 Consider some of the newly validated arguments we could now make. 
Imprisonment is not always unconstitutional. Therefore, there must always 
be an available and constitutional means of imprisonment. Therefore, it 
does not matter how bad conditions in our prisons get, for the best one will 
necessarily be constitutional. (Prison inspections are, as it turns out, merely 
 
22 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). 
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supererogatory.) The same would hold mutatis mutandis for every other 
mode of punishment. This is absurd. It could not possibly follow from any 
halfway plausible reading of the Eighth Amendment.   
 
  This brief exercise illustrates the unreasonableness of the Court’s 
requirement that petitioners and their lawyers devise their own alternative 
methods of executions. Suppose that all prisons in a state became 
overcrowded. Next, a newly imprisoned inmate challenges his prison 
sentence in his overcrowded prison under the Eighth Amendment. No court, 
surely, would require the inmate to find himself a better prison. 
Unquestionably, it would be incumbent on the state government to find 
another accommodation or to improve conditions in the current prison.23 I 
can see no reason why this ought to work any differently in the context of 
capital punishment. If a prisoner has a credible claim that the conditions of 
his imprisonment are intolerably cruel, then it is irrelevant whether the state 
has better conditions available. What is at issue is only whether the 
conditions to which this prisoner is being subjected are “cruel and unusual.” 
This is how the Court reasons in every Eighth Amendment case except 
capital punishment cases since Baze and Glossip. In these recent capital 
punishment cases, it has justified a refusal to engage in serious inquiry about 
the meaning of “cruel and unusual” in the context of executions by placing 
what ought to be the state’s burden on petitioners. As I hope now to have 
shown, the Court’s reasoning does not begin to justify this extraordinary 
step.  
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
It is hard to imagine an argument with higher stakes. Every time the 
Court affirms the requirements of Glossip, it enables state execution 
practices which cause potentially torturous deaths. Such a jurisprudence has 
real victims: Billy Irick, Thomas Arthur, and Russel Bucklew are but 
prominent examples. This brief essay has argued that the Court’s 
justifications for its holdings in Glossip and Bucklew are invalid and 
indefensible. This point is not grounded in political or moral principles. 
Whatever one thinks of the kinds of executions the Court has decided to 
tolerate, decisions like Glossip and Bucklew are grounded in a guiding 
principle that cannot possibly be correct. They should be roundly rejected.  
 
 
23 Indeed, this is how the Court has handled such challenges in the past. See, e.g., Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–88 (1978).  
